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1Hearing the Music of Others: Pierre Schaeffer's Humanist Interdiscipline1
Patrick Valiquet, Institute of Musical Research
[First revision, 24 November 2016 – corrected 30 March 2017]
Published in 1966 and revised in 1977, the Traité des objets musicaux (Treatise on musical
objets) represents the culmination of Pierre Schaeffer's thinking on the nature of music and sound.
Building upon more than a quarter century of broadcasting and compositional research, Schaeffer's
book saw immediate adoption as a research guide by the composers and technicians of the Groupe
de Recherches Musicales (GRM), the experimental broadcasting unit Schaeffer founded in 1958. It
has  since  taken  on a  reputation  as  one  of  the  canonical  texts  of  the  academic  electroacoustic
tradition as a whole. Now, a half century after its original publication, Schaeffer's finely wrought
meta-language for the relationship between human listening and musical sound is finally beginning
to appear in English translation.2 The lack of translation until now, however, has not hampered the
growth  of  a  robust  and  independent  anglophone  tradition  of  Schaeffer  scholarship.  There  is  a
particularly  strong  current  of  critical  writing  building  upon  Schaeffer's  thinking  about  the
affordances of an 'acousmatic' approach to sound, that is, when sound is encountered in the absence
of a visible source.3 With few exceptions, however, the focus has been upon putting Schaeffer's
ideas to compositional work rather than their implications for the descriptive study of music more
broadly.  Historians  have  similarly  treated  Schaeffer's  theoretical  work  as  a  footnote  to  his
endeavours  as a composer and engineer.4 And yet  these studies frequently invite us to think of
1 Early versions of this article were presented at the 2015 Annual Conference of the Royal Music Association in 
Birmingham and the weekly research seminar organised by Benedict Taylor at the Reid School of Music, University 
of Edinburgh. I would like to express my gratitude for the generous feedback I received from John Dack, Kyle 
Devine, Brian Kane, Peter Nelson, and three anonymous reviewers. Thanks are due as well to Marcelle Deschênes, 
who provided invaluable primary sources from her private archive in Montreal.
2 Pierre Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, trans. John Dack and Christine North (Berkeley, 2012); Pierre 
Schaeffer, Treatise on Musical Objects, trans. John Dack and Christine North (Berkeley, forthcoming).
3 Denis Smalley, ‘Spectromorphology and Structuring Processes’, in The Language of Electroacoustic Music, ed. 
Simon Emmerson (London, 1986); Trevor Wishart. On Sonic Art (London, 1996); Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of 
Music (Oxford, 1997); Luke Windsor, ‘Through and around the Acousmatic: The Interpretation of Electroacoustic 
Sounds’, in Music, Electronic Media and Culture, ed. Simon Emmerson (Farnham, 2000), 7–35; Brian Kane, Sound 
Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 2014).
4 Thom Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music: Pioneers in Technology and Composition, 2nd ed. (London, 
2008); Richard Taruskin, Music in the Late Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2009); Peter Manning, Electronic and 
Computer Music, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2013).
2Schaeffer  as establishing,  through his practical  work,  a new ethics  of listening itself,  proper to
electroacoustic media, in which the quantised matrices of melody, harmony, and rhythm fall away
to allow the texturally and temporally continuous flows of a truly 'post-literate' sonic experience. 
The  consensus  among  disciples  has  been  that,  because  Schaeffer's  practice  anticipated
certain  developments  in  the  technical  practice  of  electronic  music  and sound art,  the  ethics  of
listening he develops in the treatise is ripe for rediscovery.5 Parallels have been drawn between
Schaeffer's early account of radio and cinema as  arts-relais, which figures human mastery as the
key to the transformation of media into true instruments, and Walter Benjamin's call to reclaim the
political power of mechanical reproduction.6 But at the same time, a line of critique has emerged
charging  Schaeffer  with  an  ahistorical,  essentialist  conception  of  the  technologically-mediated
listening he sought to theorise.7 As Brian Kane has written, Schaeffer's theoretical writing 'silences'
technology  in  favour  of  'archetypal'  human  experience.8 Combine  this  with  the  long-standing
stereotype of  musique concrète as a kind of naturalist foil to the serialist tradition,9 and the deep
strain  of  spiritual  commitments  which  guided  Schaeffer's  interest  in  the  actualisation  of  inner
human potentials,10 and what emerges is a picture of his treatise as a defence of human agency in
the face of avant-garde technocracy. He states in the closing passage that what he felt made music
unique was its power to speak directly to the human spirit. 'Sound objects, musical structures, when
they are authentic,  no longer have the  mission of informing.  They detach themselves  from the
5 Évelyne Gayou, GRM: Le Groupe de Recherches Musicales, cinquante ans d’histoire (Paris, 2007); John Dack, 
'Translator's Note' in Pierre Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music.
6 Pierre Schaeffer, Essai sur la radio et le cinéma : esthétique et technique des arts-relais 1941-1942, ed. Carlos 
Palombini and Sophie Brunet (Paris, 2010); Carlos Palombini, ‘Technology and Pierre Schaeffer: Pierre Schaeffer’s 
Arts-Relais, Walter Benjamin’s technische Reproduzierbarkeit and Martin Heidegger’s Ge-stell’, Organised Sound 3 
(1998): 35–43; Igor Reyner, ‘Les sources de l’écoute acousmatique dans les écrits de Pierre Schaeffer’, Synergies 
Royaume-Uni et Irlande, 7 (2014): 85–91.
7 Brian Kane, ‘L’Objet Sonore Maintenant: Pierre Schaeffer, Sound Objects and the Phenomenological Reduction’, 
Organised Sound, 12 (2007), 15–24; Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochlear Sonic Art 
(London, 2009); Kane, Sound Unseen; Mitchell Hermann, ‘Unsound Phenomenologies: Harrison, Schaeffer and the 
Sound Object’, Organised Sound, 20 (2015): 300–307.
8 Kane, Sound Unseen, 39-40.
9 Paul Griffiths, A Guide to Electronic Music (New York, 1979); Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, 
Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde (Berkeley, 1995), 76-7; Michael Nyman, 
Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1999), 48.
10 Philip Nord, ‘Pierre Schaeffer and Jeune France: Cultural Politics in the Vichy Years’, French Historical Studies 30 
(2007), 685–709; Martin Kaltenecker, ‘Résonances théologiques de l’écoute chez Pierre Schaeffer’, Droits de cités 4 
(2010), http://droitdecites.org/2010/10/15/kaltenecker/.
3descriptive world, with a kind of bashfulness, to do nothing but speak better to the senses, the mind
[esprit], and the heart.'11
Schaeffer's focus is clearly fixed on the human experience of musical sound. But at the same
time he is reluctant to put his treatise forward as the basis for a practical system of composition. In
focusing on the perceptual contours of the 'sound object' itself, he explicitly casts composition as a
matter for ongoing experimental investigation. He chides the composer who rushes towards musical
results without asking fundamental questions about their material and perceptual preconditions.12
He presents the treatise not as a guide to composition, but rather as a prolegomenon to the discovery
of 'possible musics' in the future.13 It follows that, whereas Schaeffer's work should certainly be
understood as  'reductive'  in  a  methodological  sense,  it  is  not  oriented  towards  reduction  in  an
aesthetic sense. In fact, his phenomenological account of musical sound offers not only a basis for
the  invention  of  new musics,  but  a  means  of  'authentic  analysis'  applicable  in  principle  to  all
musics. While the treatise describes the Western tradition as subsuming other musics under its own
literate categories and thus refusing to hear them as anything but primitive attempts to achieve its
own ends, Schaeffer's solfège14 sets out to clear a new ground for encountering all musics on their
own terms. 'The question is not to transcribe these languages into our alphabet,' he writes, 'but to
discover  the  functions  of  their  own  musical  objects  and  the  original  organisation  that  they
determine.'15 In this regard, the intended effect of Schaeffer's reduction might almost be thought of
as  approaching  the  'irreduction'  later  put  forward  by  Bruno  Latour.16 He  seeks  to  undermine
normative accounts of musical evolution, and open listeners to a more holistic plurality of sonic
ontologies. 
11  Pierre Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux : essai interdisciplines (Paris, 1966), 662. Translations from French are 
my own unless otherwise noted.
12 Ibid, 360.
13 Ibid, 600-1.
14 A variety of translations are suggested in the literature, from Dack and North's 'music theory' to Luis-Manuel 
Garcia's 'grammar', but none captures the combination of practical and theoretical discipline entailed in the original, 
which I therefore retain throughout.
15 Ibid, 604.
16 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, 1988).
4This interest in defending the human nature of musical meaning in the face of technological
change, and by extension protecting of the essential diversity of human expression, forms an ethical
thread  which is  woven throughout  the  treatise.  But  Schaeffer's  humanism also  penetrates  more
deeply into the substance of his theory. In order to illustrate this I want to reconstruct a conversation
between the treatise and a body of literature with which Schaeffer is not commonly associated: the
structuralist  reception  of  phenomenology  in  France,  and  the  emergence  of  the  modern  'human
sciences' as famously deconstructed in Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses, also published in
1966,  and  in  Jacques  Derrida's  De  la  grammatologie,  which  appeared  the  following  year.17
Schaeffer's  failure to  address  this  network of associations may go part  of  the way, I  claim,  to
explaining the neglect of Schaeffer's treatise as a work of philosophy in France, where the book's
immediate conceptual context would have been greatly amplified. It could also help to explain the
dismissal of Schaeffer's work by early structuralist music theorists in France such as Jean-Jacques
Nattiez  and  Jean  Molino.  But  most  importantly,  an  excavation  of  Schaeffer  engagement  with
structuralism highlights the limitations of his humanism, and this leads to a number of caveats
which  must  be  raised  before  contemporary  readers  should  embrace  it  in  English  translation.
Connecting  his  work  with  his  contemporaries'  views  on  the  ethics  of  human  culture  and
communication  allows  us  to  measure  how  debates  have  either  absorbed  or  moved  on  from
Schaeffer's concerns. 
My focus is thus on the ethics embedded in Schaeffer's account of the listening subject as it
appears in the treatise. As Jairo Moreno has argued, any account of musical objects presupposes a
subject who is  the 'locus of cognition'  upon which ideas of listening and understanding can be
constructed.18 This is particularly true of Schaeffer's work. By reanimating its ethical engagements, I
hope to show that Schaeffer's treatise provides us not so much with a heretical premonition of our
17 François Dosse, History of Structuralism, trans. Deborah Glassmann, (Volume 1, Minneapolis, 1997); Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. Anonymous (London, 1970); Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 1974).
18 Jairo Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlino, 
Descartes, Rameau, and Weber (Bloomington, 2004), 7.
5musical  future,  as with an articulation of a historically-specific  'listener function',19 a bundle of
auditory relationships and knowledge about audition that circumscribes aural subjecthood as such,
proper to French intellectual life in the 1960s. If we are to make use of Schaeffer's 'interdiscipline'
in the present, I contend, we must be aware of the political and epistemological baggage this listener
function carries. 
My intention is neither to trace the genesis of Schaeffer's intentions, nor to place the treatise
on a  logical  continuum with  his  earlier  writings  and experiments.  Instead  I  gather  textual  and
intertextual  evidence  for  the  treatise's  synchronic  interaction  with  its  immediate  political  and
epistemological surroundings. My approach is thus archaeological in a Foucauldian sense.20 I am
concerned  with  the  emergence  of  inter-related  concepts  across  an  archive,  and  not  with  their
putative origins or genesis, which necessarily recede from view.21 I begin by analysing Schaeffer's
practical use of the treatise in conversation with colleagues and students.  I then dive into the text
itself, focusing on three issues which link Schaeffer to the contemporary French human sciences:
the 'authenticity' of the musical object, the concept of entropy as a model of nature and culture, and
the 'listening functions' at the centre of the musical subject. In effect I am arguing that Schaeffer's
treatise offers much more than a guide to the production of  musique concrète, which as early as
1958 Schaeffer seems to have considered to be a failed and partial experiment.22 It sets aside the
project of defining a new musical language per se in favour of outlining a functional perspective in
which  all  forms of  human sonic experience  might  be  compared in  their  cultural  and historical
contingency. But in doing so it puts forward an image of audition in its putatively natural state
which paradoxically blocks Schaeffer's appeal to musical and technological difference.
19 Veit Erlmann, Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality (New York, 2010), 23-4.
20 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York, 1972).
21 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, 1982), 37-
41; Siegfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media: Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical 
Means, trans. Gloria Custance (Cambridge, 2006).
22 Schaeffer, Traité, 24-6 and 360-85. See also Carlos Palombini, ‘Machine Songs V: From Research into Noises to 
Experimental Music’, Computer Music Journal, 17 (1993), 14–19.
6Theory in Practice
Schaeffer  claimed  to  have  begun  the  treatise  in  the  early  1950s,  apparently  during  his
directorship of the Groupe de Recherches de Musique Concrète (GRMC) for the Radiodiffusion-
Télévision Française (RTF). In a 1969 interview he recounts that he had rewritten the book in its
entirely no less than four times in those fifteen years.23 By the time of its first publication, however,
it also bore tangible traces of his interaction with students and colleagues at the GRM, the research
unit that succeeded the GRMC following Schaeffer's return in 1958 from a stint training technicians
for the French overseas service.24 As Martin Kaltenecker describes, Schaeffer's group formed a kind
of  listening  community  charged  with  testing  and  verifying  its  leader's  pronouncements.  Early
participants were responsible  for  classifying sound fragments using a system of punch cards to
allow  for  easy  sorting,  and  audiences  were  sometimes  enlisted  as  focus  groups  to  measure
preference  and  perception  in  the  wild.25 'The  effort  of  synthesis  that  [the  treatise]  represents
certainly  engages  the  responsibility  of  the  author,'  Schaeffer  writes  in  the  preface  to  the  1966
edition, 'but it rests also on the multiple ancillary works and the collaboration of a whole group.'26 
By subtitling the work  essai interdisciplines—which gives the sense of an essay  between
disciplines  more  than  something  'interdisciplinary',  as  the  expression  is  now  used—Schaeffer
signals that he understands the book as falling outside the normal domains of the disciplines it
touches  upon,  including  acoustics,  physiology,  experimental  psychology,  electronics,  and
cybernetics.27 The scope of the investigation is accordingly broad. After an introductory chapter
placing the research historically as a response to a growing crisis of musical communication, the
treatise proceeds in seven books. I focus here on the philosophical books—the first, second, and
fourth—but many of the arguments I'm summarizing extend across the more methodological and
23 Marc Pierret, Entretiens avec Pierre Schaeffer (Paris, 1969), 97.
24 Étienne L. Damome, ‘Vers un réseau outre-mer’, in Pierre Schaeffer : les constructions impatientes, ed. Martin 
Kaltenecker and Karine Le Bail (Paris, 2012).
25 Martin Kaltenecker, ‘L’Écoute comme exercise collectif’, in Pierre Schaeffer : les constructions impatientes, ed. 
Martin Kaltenecker and Karine Le Bail (Paris, 2012), 191-201 at 198–9.
26 Schaeffer, Traité, 12 and 476-8.
27 Ibid, 30-1.
7taxonomical portions of the treatise.
In the first, entitled Faire de la musique [Making Music], Schaeffer highlights the contingent
relationship  between  music  and  instruments,  tracing  an  evolutionary narrative  from the  simple
'neanderthal'  calabash  drum to  the  'acousmatic'  situation  opened up by recording  technologies.
Borrowing freely from information theory, Schaeffer describes the emergence of musical meaning
in terms of a balance between repetition and variation.28 The instrument's fixed properties are part of
the sedimented, redundant background against which novel information necessarily emerges. But
the situation changes with electronic technologies, in which the sound is not necessarily defined by
the physical properties of the source. The sound engineer must now cast musical judgements on the
sounds the machines make possible.29 The determination of a sound's musical potential shifts from
the culturally and historically contingent instrument to the ear itself.30
In the second book, entitled simply Entendre [Hearing], Schaeffer zeros in on the system of
'functional' oppositions at the heart of his model of musical perception. His functions are numbered
from one through four, each specifying a relationship between an intention and a type of object:
écouter or  indexical  listening,  ouïr or  passive  reception,  entendre or  qualitative  hearing,  and
comprendre or understanding. He then proceeds to enumerate the possible circuits and oppositions
that can occur between these relational states, before comparing his model with 'physiological' and
'physical' accounts such as those of Werner Meyer-Eppler and Fritz Winckel.31 He concludes that
the crux of musical communication is neither sensory nor acoustic, inviting the reader to imagine
'an experimental field of specifically musical perception, where the incitation of an exterior signal
and the consciousness of a musical meaning would be conveniently confronted'.32 He closes the
book with a diagrammatic synthesis showing how the various 'dualisms' identified in the functional
model  can  be  subsumed  in  the  'original  unity'  of  the  sound  object  as  disclosed  by  'reduced
28 Ibid, 43.
29 Ibid, 85.
30 Ibid, 98.
31 Ibid, 134-6.
32 Ibid, 139.
8listening'.33
After  a  third  book  devoted  to  juxtaposing  standard  psychoacoustic  models  of  audition,
which measures ordered correlations between stimulus and perception, and an 'experimental' model,
which seeks to find origin of musical relations by focusing only on the structure of perception,34
Schaeffer continues with a fourth book in which he posits the necessity of the sound object on a
more general level. He opens by borrowing the notion of  epoché from Husserl, claiming that by
bracketing causal relations one constitutes the transcendental sound object in experience.35 But he
quickly leaves phenomenology behind to develop an account of the relations between objects and
structures heavily influenced by the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman
Jakobson, and specifically the notion of the phoneme.36 Here he considers comparisons between
traditional  musical  structure,  linguistic  structure,  and the  structure of  'natural  sounds',  focusing
again on the relational interaction between the sound object and the various 'codes' which give it
meaning.37 He concludes the book with an argument for his own programme of research, which he
suggests will enable the musician to derive new 'authentic' codes, practically and inductively, from
the preparation and study of sound objects themselves, rather than with the help of pre-existing
structures or scales.38 Books five and six present the methodology and the results of this research:
the criteria for a morphology and typology of sound objects, and a  solfège leading to descriptive
analysis and the 'synthesis of musical structures'. Again, however, Schaeffer is ambivalent about the
potential for such a synthesis. He writes, 'We do not have at our disposal, for the moment, sufficient
results to affirm anything at all on the level of possible or desirable syntheses.'39 Finally, in book
seven, he concludes with a restatement of his commitment to discipline as the essential path toward
understanding and invention.
The early consensus inside the GRM seems to have been that, because Schaeffer's book was
33 Ibid, 154.
34 Ibid, 168-9.
35 Ibid, 267.
36 Ibid, 278 and 286-9.
37 Ibid, 282-3.
38 Ibid, 381.
39 Ibid, 498.
9so idiosyncratically argued and far-reaching in scope, most readers would miss its core messages
without special initiation.  Writing in a celebratory issue of the GRM's in-house journal  Cahiers
recherche/musique for the tenth anniversary of the treatise's publication, Schaeffer's disciple Michel
Chion offered this diagnosis of the conditions that seemed to have conspired so quickly against
what, in his opinion, should have been a far more 'explosive' book:
Contemporary music in 1966 was already softly awakening from the great scientistic and
unifying  dream of  the  post-war  period—do you  remember?  A thousand  years  of  serial
music, an entirely determinate art-science… Music set about to accept its own madness, its
relativity, the contingency and the diversity of its thousand 'discourses' [langages]. Thus, in
an ideological situation that had become hospitable and flexible [souple], the Traité hardly
found  the  resistance  to  confirm  its  impact.  Furthermore,  as  it  ignored  psychoanalysis,
marxism, and other current disciplines, it could not count on fashion to carry it. It didn't
address  itself  except  to  those  whom its  ideas  really  interested;  that  is  to  say,  very  few
people.40
In short, Chion claims, Schaeffer's early readers found themselves disarmed by a book filled
with ideas that may have been all too timely, but which also refused to deal in the 'preemptory and
scintillating phrases' that endowed the works of, say, a Roland Barthes or a Jacques Lacan with such
energy  for  the  French  intelligentsia.  Despite  the  rapid  proliferation  of  institutions  for  'music
research'  closely related to  that  which Schaeffer  had promoted throughout his  own institutional
career, the Traité had already garnered a reputation as a pétard mouillé, weighed down with empty
polemic, and appealing only to the 'closed sect' that had begun forming inside the GRM.41
Chion's eulogy stops enticingly short of naming the specific perpetrators of this injustice, but
by 1976 the  general  tendency of  post-1968 cultural  reform had already moved away from his
mentor's  vision.  In  a  1974  push  to  depoliticize  the  French  communications  sector,  the  new
government of Valéry d'Estaing had dismantled the monopoly of the Office de la Radio-Television
40 Michel Chion, ‘Jubile pour un livre seul’, Cahiers recherche/musique, 2 (1976), 19–24 at 20.
41 Ibid, 19-20.
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Française (ORTF),  a move which threatened to leave the GRM stranded. One year away from
retirement, Schaeffer's last major task as director would thus be to fight for the life of the very
institution he had fought so vehemently since the end of the war to preserve.42 Schaeffer's efforts did
meet  some degree  of success—the Institut  national  de l'audiovisuel  (INA) took over  all  of the
ORTF's  archival  and public outreach services  early the following year—but his  reputation as a
researcher seems to have been more difficult to salvage.
The most  important  setback came about  as a result  of the high-profile  alliance between
d'Estaing's predecessor Georges Pompidou and Schaeffer's longtime rival Pierre Boulez. Georgina
Born, building on earlier assessments by Pierre-Michel Menger, has characterized Pompidou's move
as a calculated attempt to  place  the international  enfant terrible of  the avant-garde back in the
service of national interests after the postwar decline of France's cultural profile and the political
embarrassments  of  May 68.43 Anne Veitl  suggests  that  the  move reflected  the  fact  that  French
attitudes towards high culture still  excluded radio and television.44 Whatever the case,  Boulez's
ascendancy  would  be  confirmed  in  1977  with  the  opening  of  the  Institut  de  Recherche  et  de
Coordination  Acoustique/Musique  (IRCAM).  In  addition  to  luring  away  some  of  the  GRM's
precious  technical  staff,  Schaeffer's  followers  saw  IRCAM  as  hijacking  the  GRM's  research
mandate in the service of a malicious technocratic positivism.45 Indeed, some early commentators
seem to have seen the 'music research' of the GRM's ORTF phase as a mere stepping stone towards
the Boulezian model that eventually eclipsed it.46 Little wonder that Schaeffer's supporters felt so
quickly obliged to distinguish their work from that of outsiders. 'If we now see well the seductions
of a “scientistic” conception of musical research (a feeling of knowledge and of power over sound),'
42 Pierre Schaeffer, Les Antennes de Jéricho (Paris, 1978); Évelyne Gayou, ‘The GRM: Landmarks on a Historic 
Route’, Organised Sound, 12 (2007), 203–11 at 208-9. For a broader account of the rise and fall of Schaeffer's 
model of musical research highlighting its ramifications for the governance of contemporary music in France see 
also Anne Veitl, Politiques de la musique contemporaine : le compositeur, la « recherche musicale » et l’état en 
France de 1958 à 1991 (Paris, 1997).
43 Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde 
(Berkeley, 1995), 80-6; cf. Pierre-Michel Menger, Le paradoxe du musicien (Paris, 1983).
44 Veitl, Politiques, 43-4.
45 Martin Kaltenecker and Karine Le Bail, ‘Jalons’, in Martin Kaltenecker and Karine Le Bail (eds.), Pierre Schaeffer : 
les constructions impatientes (Paris, 2012), 9–65 at 56.
46 See Born, Rationalizing Culture, 85–6 and Veitl, Politiques. This interpretation, framed by Born as a progression 
and by Veitl as a decline, would have seemed highly plausible at the peak of IRCAM's notoriety in the 1990s.
11
Chion's eulogy for the Traité continues, 'we also see well that SCHAEFFER brought division and
doubt to this domain by dealing in truths such as these: sound perceived is not the physical signal,
music is not acoustics, it  is not absolute structure, but the result of a relation between subject and
object.'47
And  yet  the  late-twentieth-century  Schaefferian  literature  made  little  progress  in
popularizing these distinctions. From the series of guides and lexiques which appeared in France,48
to the various exegeses and expansions proposed in the United Kingdom,49 most readers favoured a
view of the treatise as a collection of practical advice specific to the electroacoustic medium. The
GRM itself seems to have accepted its place in the shadow of IRCAM, turning its attention from the
rigours of Schaeffer's experimental music research to a more traditional public life of concert series,
pedagogical  outreach,  and  services  to  composers.50 Meanwhile,  in  the  final  years  of  his  life,
Schaeffer  expressed  a  palpable  dismay,  at  times  bordering  on  detraction,  at  the  progress  of
contemporary  composition.51 Instead  of  taking  up  the  hard  task  of  arguing  for  a  generalised,
'authentic'  solfège applicable  to  all  musics,  Schaeffer's  disciples  had  chosen  the  much  less
controversial course of ensuring the survival of their own genre.
Part of the reason that reception of the treatise remains so troubled and fragmentary may be
that Schaeffer's conceptual toolbox is still so often abstracted from this larger didactic ambition. Of
course, the centrality of education in Schaeffer's career as a whole has not gone unnoticed. 'Trying
to bend oneself to a discipline that opposes one's penchants', he declares in a 1969 interview, 'even
47 Chion, ‘Jubile pour un livre seul’, 21 [original emphasis].
48 Michel Chion, Guide des objets sonores : Pierre Schaeffer et la recherche musicale (Paris, 1983); Michel Chion, 
L’art des sons fixés : ou la musique concrètement (Paris, 1991); François Bayle, Musique acousmatique : 
propositions... positions (Paris, 1993), 179-90; Jean-François Augoyard and Henri Torgue, Sonic Experience: A 
Guide to Everyday Sounds, trans. Andra McCartney and David Paquette, (Montreal, 2005). There is also an 
unpublished practical lexique by Québécois composer Marcelle Deschênes, designed for use in the electroacoustic 
curriculum at Université de Montréal beginning in 1980.
49 Denis Smalley, ‘Spectromorphology and Structuring Processes’, in The Language of Electroacoustic Music, ed. 
Simon Emmerson (London, 1986), 107–26; John Dack, ‘The Relationship between Electro-Acoustic Music and 
Instrumental/Vocal Composition in Europe in the Period 1948-70’ (PhD Thesis, Middlesex, 1989); Carlos 
Palombini, ‘Pierre Schaeffer’s Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects’ (DPhil thesis, Durham, 1992).
50 Gayou, ‘The GRM', 209-10.
51 Tim Hodgkinson, ‘An Interview with Pierre Schaeffer - Pioneer of Musique Concrète’, ReR Quarterly, 2, 1 (1987), 
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if one only reaches it imperfectly, is one of the only means of liberation that I know.' 52 Beginning
with  the  visits  of  students  like  Pierre  Henry,  Pierre  Boulez  and  Karlheinz  Stockhausen  to  the
fledgling Club d'essai, Schaeffer's research into sound had always been integrated with pedagogy.53
Indeed, this commitment seems to have grown from the seeds of his work as a Catholic scoutmaster
during  the  occupation.54 The  GRM  launched  an  informal  two-year  stage as  a  prerequisite  to
membership  in  1961.  In  1968,  this  was  replaced  with  a  one-year  course  accredited  by  the
Conservatoire de Paris. Schaeffer took up a faculty post as its director, a move the GRM must have
seen as signalling a consecration of their founder's ideas.55 From that point until the opening of the
INA in 1976, the more intensive Conservatoire course served as the GRM's main intake point for
new  stagaires.  The  fragments  of  its  content  that  survive paint  a  remarkably  holistic  picture of
Schaeffer's outlook.
A syllabus circulated to students in advance describes the course in sweeping terms as an
'experimental' introduction to the 'new musical concepts' and 'new practices' brought about by the
'influence of audio-visual techniques on music' and the 'evolution of musical careers as a function of
record, radio, cinema and television'.56 The document addresses an audience not only of composers,
but of advanced students in all  disciplines.57 The mandatory module taught by Guy Reibel and
Henri  Chiarucci  on  solfège  expérimentale,  for  example,  should  be  'just  as  useful  to  the
instrumentalist as to the composer, to the orchestral conductor as to the listener, and to all musicians
52 Pierret, Entretiens avec Pierre Schaeffer, 74.
53 Robin Maconie, Other Planets: The Music of Karlheinz Stockhausen (Lanham, 2005), 99; Schaeffer, In Search of a 
Concrete Music.
54 Philip Nord, ‘Pierre Schaeffer and Jeune France'.
55 Gayou, ‘The GRM’, 207.
56 Groupe de Recherche Musicale, 'Musique fondamentale et appliquée à l'audio visuel' (Paris, 1968), Montreal, 
Private Archive of Marcelle Deschênes.
57 The class of the GRM's first Conservatoire course didn't necessarily live up to the aspiration. It consisted mainly of 
composers, alongside a handful of pianists, vocalists, and engineers. Among the more notable of the 40 enrolled in 
the 1968-69 session were: later GRM member Jacques Lejeune; the founders of the Groupe de Musique 
Expérimentale de Bourges, Christian Clozier and Françoise Barrière; Canadian composers Micheline Coulombe 
Saint-Marcoux and Marcelle Deschênes, founders of the electroacoustic courses at the Conservatoire de Montréal 
and Université de Montréal, respectively; Argentine composers Luis-Maria Serra and Eduardo Bertola; and a 
considerable number of psychedelic rock enthusiasts, among them Igor Wakhévitch, who would go on to compose 
music for Salvador Dalí's neglected 1974 opera Être Dieu. Groupe de Recherche Musicale, 'Stage 68/69' (Paris, 
1968), Montreal, Private Archive of Marcelle Deschênes.
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exercising pedagogical or critical responsibilities'.58 The remaining modules fell into three streams
acccording  to  specialty.  The  first,  taught  by  Bernard  Parmegiani  and  Albert  Laracine,  offered
training in 'execution in front of the microphone' for the 'young virtuosos' who needed to learn to
perform in studio for the technicians of the ORTF. The second, taught by Schaeffer himself with
assistant Daniel Charles, was the provocatively titled  musique fondamentale. In a series of 'open
discussions',  it  promised  to  cover  the  state  of  contemporary  music,  the  development  of  new
materials and forms, the music of non-western cultures, and the role of music in society. Again, the
syllabus  strikes  a  now  familiar  note  of  movement  across  disciplines.  It  specifically  invites
participation  from researchers  outside  the  conservatory,  calling  emphatically  to  'renew musical
culture through a confrontation with other disciplines and through a re-examination of its social
functions, and indeed of its organization and its economy'.59 Only the third stream—led by François
Bayle and Ivo Malec, and entitled  stage de musique expérimentale—places explicit emphasis on
compositional matters. And in keeping with the energy of the times, these classes situate musique
concrète within broader aesthetic and political concerns. Specifically, Bayle and Malec highlight the
importance of improvised and collective creation, encouraging students to explore theatrical and
participatory actions clearly associated with the new politics of artistic liberation. Examples for
analysis included the work of utopian collectives like Musica Elettronica Viva, whose performances
students also had opportunities to attend in person.60
We can track Schaeffer's presentation of his own ideas in the classroom with the help of
notes taken in simplified shorthand by his Québécois student, Marcelle Deschênes, who had won a
scholarship  to  attend  after  completing  her  examinations  in  composition  under  Serge  Garant  at
Université de Montréal.61 Deschênes' notebook records seven lectures by Schaeffer ranging from the
58 Groupe de Recherche Musicale, 'Musique fondamentale'.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. On the politics of MEV's practice during this period see Amy Beal, ‘“Music Is a Universal Human Right”: 
Musica Elettronica Viva’, in Sound Commitments: Avant-Garde Music and the Sixties, ed. Robert Adlington 
(Oxford, 2009). 
61 Marcelle Deschênes, 'GRM Notebook 68-69', Montreal, Private Archive of Marcelle Deschênes; Marie-Thérèse 
Lefebvre, ‘Micheline Coulombe Saint-Marcoux et Marcelle Deschênes : Pionnières dans le sentier de la création 
électroacoustique’, Circuit : musiques contemporaines, 19 (2009), 23–41.
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introductory session of 20 November 1968, to an undated session in early February 1969, as well as
six  solfège sessions,  and six sessions  of  musique expérimentale.  Rather  than follow the book's
argument  to  the  letter,  Schaeffer's  seminar  samples  unevenly  from  the  Introduction  and  the
philosophical  books  I  summarized  above.  He  devotes  a  full  four  sessions  to  the  introductory
arguments on music's 'historical situation'. He appears to have moved quite studiously through his
theory's rationale, interpolating musical and visual illustrations that range from Varèse to gagaku.
Again, his emphasis is on understanding musical listening as such, considered separately from any
defence of musique concrète. To paraphrase the first lecture, Schaeffer saw contemporary music as
undergoing a crisis of its codes and systems of reference. This crisis had been brought about by
three  factors.  First,  composers  had  begun  to  explore  new  materials,  and  thus  listeners  were
confronted with a previously unknown diversity of experimental idioms. Second, technology had
transformed both the production of music and the shape of the musical  métier. And third, mass
communication and globalization had opened listeners around the world to the musics of others; the
'intellectual colonialism' of previous generations was being supplanted by a rising curiosity towards
the plurality of musical expression around the world.62 What was required, Schaeffer went on to say,
was a reconsideration of the fundamentals of all musics guided by a 'very general humanism'. The
new discipline should aspire to the structural universality of Saussure's linguistics and Lévi-Strauss'
anthropology,  but  also  harness  the  empirical  and  analytical  power  of  recording  and  broadcast
technology.63 This meant understanding the shared structures that allow listeners to make sense of
music as individuals. One must, he argues, 'substitute the idea of robust systems relying on notation
with a lived music, sensed in diverse ways'. Turning to the listening experience allows us to rethink
music in a 'modern' way, recognising it as having a 'relativity'  akin to Einsteinian physics.64 He
spends the next three sessions expanding on the historical conditions for this renewal.
How do we square this emphasis on plurality and relativity with Schaeffer's reputation as a
62 Ibid, cf. Schaeffer, Traité, 17–9.
63 Deschênes, 'GRM Notebook 68/69'; cf. Schaeffer, Traité, 38.
64 Deschênes, 'GRM Notebook 68-69'.
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strict disciplinarian and a purveyor of essentialist 'myths' about the relationship between listening
and technology?65 Does reduced listening help or hinder musical pluralism?66 Several aspects of the
treatise  already  point  to  a  structuralist  synthesis.  First  of  course  is  the  methodical  course  of
empirically-informed classification Schaeffer insists upon as a prerequisite to musical invention, an
approach Luis-Manuel Garcia describes as 'grounded in epistemologies of laboratory science' and
'lavishly taxonomic'.67 Indeed, early students found themselves totally disarmed in their efforts to
derive  compositional  prescriptions  from  the  vast  matrix  of  phenomenal  categories  Schaeffer's
practice produced.68 Perhaps this explains why prominent figures like Boulez dismissed the treatise
as the work of a mere technician.69 We can give Schaeffer more credit, I suggest, by following the
links  to  structuralism  evident  in  the  treatise's  treatments  of  history,  culture,  and  perception.
Structuralism also provides an important context for Schaeffer's reception of phenomenology, which
some commentators have criticised as incomplete or erroneous.70 In fact, when the topic of the
phenomenological reduction arises in the fifth and sixth lectures of the 1968 stage, Schaeffer sets it
aside  as  only  one of  many  paths  in  the  disciplinary  'crossroads'  necessitated by the  project  of
fundamental music research. Tellingly, his focus is not on the short technical explanation of the
époché in Book IV, but the division of 'listening functions' that opens Book II.71 Reading it as a
rubric for discerning between levels of sonic signification, I suggest that its broader purpose is in a
certain sense to naturalize the play of musical difference.
65 Kane, Sound Unseen, 40–1.
66 Many in the anglophone acousmatic tradition, for example, figure reduced listening as a special analytical attitude 
that excludes the kind of contextual information that makes most music meaningful. Denis Smalley, ‘The Listening 
Imagination: Listening in the Electroacoustic Era’, Contemporary Music Review, 13 (1996), 77–107; Leigh Landy, 
‘Écoute Réduite - a Wrong Turn in the History of Electroacoustic Music?’ NZEMS 2009 (Auckland, 2009); Adrian 
Moore, Sonic Art: An Introduction to Electroacoustic Music Composition (New York, 2016).
67 Luis-Manuel Garcia, ‘Beats, Flesh, and Grain: Sonic Tactility and Affect in Electronic Dance Music’, Sound Studies,
1 (2015), 59–76 at 67–8. On the association between structuralism and scientific approaches in the avant-garde see 
also Morag Grant, Serial Music, Serial Aesthetics: Compositional Theory in Post-War Europe (Cambridge, 2001) 
and Taruskin, Music in the Late Twentieth Century.
68 François Delalande, ‘Ce que le G.R.M. pense du T.O.M.’, Cahiers recherche/musique, 2 (1976), 27–33.
69 Born, Rationalizing Culture, 76.
70 Kane, Sound Unseen; Makis Solomos, ‘Schaeffer phénoménologue’, in Ouïr, entendre, écouter, comprendre après 
Schaeffer, ed. François Bayle and Denis Dufour, (Paris, 1999), 53–67.
71 Deschênes, 'GRM Notebook 68-69'.
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Object – Structure – Subject
Schaeffer prefaces his brief account of the phenomenological reduction in the treatise by
reflecting on the value of the phenomenological enterprise. Instead of using philosophy to deduce
an  experimental  method,  Schaeffer  claims  to  have  arrived  at  a  philosophical  explication  only
through slow and painstaking practice: 'From fortuitous discovery to experiment [expérience], from
experiment to explication, we have followed the normal trajectory of all experimental research.'72
And yet, this process could have continued forever, making appeal 'to the theory of knowledge
[connaissance],  and  to  the  relations  of  man  with  the  world.'73 Thus,  his  engagement  with
phenomenology must be pragmatic. 'Let us strive not to lose ourselves in a debate which has gone
on  for  centuries,  and  recognise  at  least,  when  we  find  them  formulated  by  philosophers,  the
principles that correspond to our implicit experience. Let us choose among the intellectual tools that
others  have  spent  their  lives  forging,  those which  are adapted  to  our  needs.'74 And yet,  in  the
following  paragraph,  he  makes  his  famous  claim  to  have  been 'doing phenomenology without
knowing  it,  which  is  better,  all  things  considered,  than  talking  about  phenomenology  without
practicing it.'75 In a sense, Schaeffer is implying here that his experiments would have had the same
results if he had never heard of phenomenology and continued to follow his 'implicit experience'. So
what value would his claim to phenomenological 'correspondence' have had for his initial readers?
What intellectual links would this rather cursory gesture to the phenomenological tradition establish
for Schaeffer at this stage in his career?
Most commentators focus on the phenomenological sources cited directly in the treatise.
Noting that the typo-morphology and the solfège which constitute the bulk of the treatise are more
phenomenological in style than in substance, Makis Solomos points to the influence of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, who until  his sudden death in 1961 was the main proponent  of the tradition in
France.  The  descriptive  tables  in  Book  VI,  for  example,  treat  sound  objects  as  if  they  were
72 Schaeffer, Traité, 261–2.
73 Ibid, 262.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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sensations independent  of perception, and thus discard whatever remains of their  pre-subjective
universality.76 Kane  argues  against  Solomos  that  Schaeffer's  phenomenology  was  primarily
Husserlian, pointing to the increasing availability of Husserl's work in France through translations
by Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, and Suzanne Bachelard, and highlighting Schaeffer's strict
account  of  the  époché.77 Both  connections  are  important  for  understanding  how the  reduction
operates in the treatise, but they leave the connection between the reduction and the taxonomies
unexplained.  By  looking  closer  at  the  public  life  of  phenomenology  around  the  time  of  the
publication of the treatise, can we reconstruct the bridge between the 'lived experience' of reduction
and the 'functional' mechanics of the solfège?
Schaeffer's  reading  of  the  reduction  comes  rather  late  in  the  French  reception  of
phenomenology. By the time the treatise was finally published the phenomenological method had
undergone several  waves  of  reinterpretation  as  political  and technical  debates  shifted  from the
existentialist  reception that dominated the war years to the structuralist one that emerged in the
1950s.78 For the existentialist thinkers, phenomenology was far removed from Husserl's detached,
formalist search for universal essences. Following Heidegger, they stood for a phenomenology that
privileged situated, lived experience.79 Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, accused Husserl of being 'a
phenomenalist  rather  than  a  phenomenologist',  so  trapped  in  his  idealist  world  of  functional
descriptions of essences that he was unable to grasp the 'existential dialectic', the relationship of the
thinking mind or cogito to the 'totality of being which constitutes human reality'.80 They also came
under  the  influence  of  Russian  emigré  Alexandre  Kojève's  lectures  on  Hegel,81 discarding  the
76 Solomos, ‘Schaeffer Phénoménologue’.
77 Kane, Sound Unseen, 17–22.
78 Dosse, History of Structuralism, 37-42; Edward Baring, The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-1968 
(Cambridge, 2011), 46-7.
79 Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley, Critical Humanisms: Humanist/Anti-Humanist Dialogues (Edinburgh, 2003), 
41-3.
80 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, (New 
York, 1992), 119-20.
81 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. James H. 
Nichols, (Ithaca, 1969). These lectures, which took place at the École pratique des hautes études between 1933 and 
1939, were attended not only by Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty but also Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, and 
Raymond Aron. Kojève's 'neo-Marxist' and 'post-Heideggerian' reading of Hegel also had a formative influence on 
the post-structuralist generation. See Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (New York, 2006), 91.
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transcendental subject of the Husserlian reduction for a historical account of the subject in open-
ended, dialectical progress. Kojève's Hegel appealed strongly to a generation forced to reconstruct
its ethical outlook in the aftermath of war. 'Hegel's thought is existentialist', argued Merleau-Ponty
in a 1946 article, 'in that it views man not as being from the start a consciousness in full possession
of its own clear thoughts but as a life which is its own responsibility and which tries to understand
itself.'82 Thus the existentialists replaced the question of disclosing essences in their purity with a
dialectical critique of values that foregrounded the interrelationship between the meaning in things
and the meaning proffered by consciousness.83 As Sartre argued, there could be no meaning except
in the situated, intentional choice of a free, individual human subject, and thus the basis of moral
behaviour was taking responsibility for one's own role in constructing the world.84 
The  existentialists  remained  influential  long  after  the  war,  but  their  'humanist'  message
quickly sprouted a variety of anti-humanist reactions. By the early 1950s, the existentialist emphasis
on freedom and authenticity was under attack from young philosophers on the left reading Husserl
for his work on the sciences rather than as a theorist of 'bourgeois subjectivity', and by Christians
seeking to counteract Sartre's atheism.85 Schaeffer's position is ambiguous, but his optimism about
the  universality  of  individual  experience,  suspicion  about  the  reach  of  modern  science,  and
unorthodox spiritual values, seem to have placed him more often on the side of the humanists, even
by the time the treatise appeared.86 By listening beyond the 'natural'  and the 'cultural'  Schaeffer
seeks an 'authentic sound object... accessible if possible to every listening person.'87  He was not the
first  to  express  such  views.  As music  critic  for  Les  Temps modernes, serialist  composer  René
Leibowitz  became  a  vocal  proponent  of  an  existentialist  ethics.88 Among  the  first  to  apply
82 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert Dreyfus and Patricia Allen 
Dreyfus, (Evanston, 1964), 63-70 at 65.
83 Dosse, History of Structuralism, 37.
84 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London, 1948), 41.
85 Baring, The Young Derrida, 40-7; cf. Tran Duc Thao, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, trans. Daniel 
Herman and Donald Morano, (Dordrecht, 1986); Jean-François Lyotard, La Phénoménologie (Paris, 1954).
86 Kaltenecker, ‘Résonances théologiques de l’écoute chez Pierre Schaeffer’. Palombini suggests that the appeal of 
phenomenology for Schaeffer was that it provide him a suitably scientific weapon to fight against the scientificity of
elektronische Musik. Palombini, 'Pierre Schaeffer's Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects', 57-8.
87 Schaeffer, Traité, 271.
88 See also René Leibowitz, L’Artiste et sa conscience : esquisse d’une dialectique de la conscience artistique (Paris, 
1950). 
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existentialist phenomenology as an analytical method was Russian émigré Boris de Schloezer in his
1947  Introduction  à  J.-S.  Bach.  Completed  during  the  war,  Schloezer's  book on Bach  takes  a
deceptively experimental approach to its very traditional subject matter. Instead of the digestible
'life and works'  promised by its title,  Introduction à J.-S. Bach  sets out toward the much more
ambitious goal of 'rethinking the musical fact' as such.89 While Schloezer's conclusions converge on
the 'concrete ideality' of the musical work in a manner reminiscent of Roman Ingarden,90 his work
clearly anticipates Schaeffer's in both its methodology and its terminology. 
Charting  a  synthetic  course  between  subjectivism  and  objectivism  similar  to  Merleau-
Ponty's  in  the  introduction  to  Phénoménologie  de  la  perception,  Schloezer  considers  how the
musical  work can remain a 'concrete'  thing at  the same time as being independent of the three
modes of materiality he identifies as pertaining to musical phenomena: the graphic materiality of
the score, the vibrational materiality of acoustic waves, and the psychological materiality of the
'mental attitudes' to which the sounds give rise in the brains of listeners.91 After considering the
differences  between musical  and linguistic  signification,  he  concludes,  in  terms which  strongly
resemble  Schaeffer's  in  Chapter  17  of  the  Traité,  that  while  in  linguistic  communication  the
sounding signifier is an arbitrary element effectively effaced by the mental signified, in music the
sonic is heard and interpreted as such, not decoded into some other form but immanent to the
musical experience.92 Understanding music thus consists for Schloezer not in mastering a reference
system of scales and chords, but in adopting a particular kind of listening attitude: not just hearing
(entendre),  but  attending (écouter)  to  the series of sounds with a view towards comprehending
(comprendre)  it  as  a  system  of  immanent  relations.93 Curiously  close  matches  to  Schaeffer's
89 Boris de Schloezer, Introduction à J.-S. Bach : essai d’esthétique musicale (Paris, 1947), 12.
90 Fragne, 'À la recherche de la réalité musicale', v; cf. Roman Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of Its 
Identity, trans. Adam Czerniawski, (London, 1986). Schloezer also corresponds with Ingarden in his insistence that 
the musical work can be reconstructed, or in Ingarden's terms 'concretized' by the listener following an engaged 
reception (see Schloezer, Introduction, 45). Ingarden studied with Husserl in Göttingen and Freiburg and was one of 
the first to apply the phenomenological reduction to music. Ingarden's work on music was not translated into French 
until the 1980s, but Schloezer may have read it in German. Max Rieser, ‘Roman Ingarden and His Time’, in Roman 
Ingarden The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity (London, 1986), 159–73 at 161.
91 Schloezer, Introduction, 27; cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de La Perception (Paris, 1945).
92 Schloezer, Introduction, 33; cf. Schaeffer, Traité, 296-7. Note that Schloezer and Schaeffer are both engaging here 
with Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale, the significance of which I return to below.
93 Schloezer, Introduction, 33-35. Schloezer uses the words for these attitudes differently from Schaeffer's listening 
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language and approach can also be found. Schloezer uses the term 'objet sonore', for example, to
distinguish the  musical  work from its  acoustic  materiality,94 the term 'allure'  to  distinguish  the
experienced sense of timing from the absolute values of tempo and note duration,95 and the terms
'concrete' and 'abstract' to distinguish the real and specific aspects of musical phenomena from their
discursive descriptions and categorizations.
A similar concern with authenticity informs Swiss conductor Ernest Ansermet's formidable
1961 volume  Les Fondements de la musique dans la conscience humaine.96 Conceived in 1943,
sketched between 1948 and 1951, and first published in 1961, Ansermet's book is encyclopedic in
scope, if not necessarily in substance.97 Its 700 pages include discussions of musical consciousness,
the auditory horizon, the embodiment of music in sound, the form of musical expression, and the
evolution  of  music  through history,  alongside nearly  200 pages of  'marginal  notes'  on science,
history, and the 'structures of reflection'. In spite of its author's obvious enthusiasm, the book is
riddled with idiosyncrasies. Like Schloezer and Schaeffer, Ansermet understood music to have form
and meaning only in the immediate flow of the listening experience. While acousticians might look
for the reactions of the ear to physical waves, for Ansermet the crux of the musical experience lay in
the way these waves, via the auditory apparatus, could be resolved into chords and intervals by an
active musical consciousness.98 Ansermet thus sought to ground an authentic listenership attuned to
organic, prescientific reflection, the authority of which he saw as under assault by the forces of
scientism  and  an  ascendent  serialist  avant-garde.99 Lured  by  Husserl's  mathematical  writings,
however, Ansermet concludes the correlation between acoustic vibration and musical apperception
must  be  governed  by  a  transcendental  system  of  'noetic  logarithms',  the  exposition  of  which
occupies much of the opening chapter and several of the appendices.100 
functions, which I discuss below. Hence the difference in my translation.
94 Schloezer, Introduction, 44.
95 Schloezer, Introduction, 57-58.
96 Ernest Ansermet, Les Fondements de la musique dans la conscience humaine et autres écrits (Paris, 1989).
97 Jean-Claude Piguet, La Pensée d’Ernest Ansermet (Lausanne, 1983).
98 Ansermet, Fondements, 373-9.
99 Ansermet, Fondements, 296-7 and 896-907.
100Ansermet, Fondements, 314-8. Solomos highlights this problem in a justifiably dismissive mention of Ansermet's 
book. See Solomos, ‘Schaeffer phénoménologue’.
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Although he makes no reference to them in the treatise, there is little doubt that Schaeffer
was aware of his precursors while writing it. Chapter 14 of his earlier book À la recherche d'une
musique concrète is devoted almost entirely to Schaeffer's reflections on sketches which Ansermet
had  presented  at  early  meetings  of  the  International  Music  Council  in  Paris.  Here  Schaeffer
responds at length to Ansermet's existentialist attempt to resolve the correlation between musical
objects and subjects, dubious of his mathematical speculations, but approving of the denouncement
of serialist music as 'inauthentic'.101 Although it contains no explicit citations to Schloezer's work,
Schaeffer's  1952 book does  contain frequent  references  to  the  work of Bach,  and at  one point
speculates on the fruitfulness of an attempt to apply Gestalt theories to Bach that obviously recalls
Schloezer's work.102 Conversation around Schloezer's use of phenomenology aired prominently both
in Les Temps modernes and elsewhere in years following the war,103 and Schloezer was among the
most notable reviewers of Schaeffer's À la recherche.104 
By the time the treatise appeared in 1966, however, phenomenology's force of attraction in
French intellectual culture had diminished in the face of sustained anti-humanist critique.105 The
German left attacked phenomenology's development under Heidegger. Adorno, for example,  saw
the  'authentic'  space left  over  after  the  phenomenological  reduction  as  an abdication of critical
engagement.106 A second line of attack came from the existentialists' students in France. Foucault
was particularly skeptical of his teacher Merleau-Ponty's efforts to take the lived experience of the
body  as  the  condition  of  existence  of  all  knowledge.107 According  to  Foucault,  the  existential
phenomenologist  claimed  to  prove  the  transcendence  of  the  body,  but  provided only empirical
observations on its particular conditions.108 Furthermore, the existential phenomenologist asserted
101Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, 113-22.
102Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, 153-6 and 163-6.
103Robert Francès, ‘La Structure en musique’, Les Temps modernes 43 (1948), 730; Boris de Schloezer, ‘Sens, forme et 
structure en musique’, Les Temps modernes 43 (1949), 939. See also Pierre Boulez, ‘Bach’s Moment’, in Paule 
Thévenin (ed.), Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship, trans. Stephen Walsh, (Oxford, 1991), 1–14 at 5-6.
104Boris de Schlœzer, ‘Musique concrète, musique abstraite, musique...’, La Nouvelle revue française, 5 (1953), 920-3.
105Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Social Sciences’, in Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass, (London, 2001), 278-93; Dosse, History of Structuralism.
106Theodor Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, (London, 2007), 
102-3.
107Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 33-4.
108Ibid, 34.
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that the horizon of practices and beliefs formed the necessary background of all thought, while at
the same time asserting the methodological  necessity of standing outside that background.109 In
short,  for  Foucault  phenomenology  took  for  granted  the  existence  of  the  enculturated  and
historically  sedimented  'man'  it  sought  to  establish  as  primary.110 Schaeffer's  treatise  invokes
phenomenological privilege long after the existentialist boom of the 1940s, and thus is significantly
more susceptible to such criticisms than the work of Ansermet or Schloezer.  The bracketing of
background knowledge plays a central role in the way Schaeffer defines the intelligibility of the
sound object. 
In the treatise, Schaeffer folds the problem of the background into the category of 'structure'.
He distinguishes three levels of structure at the close of Chapter 15, first for the relations between
items in a set (such as the notes in a melody), second for the relations between figure and ground,
third for the way the object is conditioned by a system of reference.111 'Remove this object from the
structure to which it belongs', he writes in Chapter 16, 'and just as soon it becomes structure itself,
and can hardly be appreciated except by mediating its resolution in objects at the level below.'112
Elsewhere,  the  universality  of  the  object-structure  pair  provides  the  conceptual  basis  for  the
practical distinction between typology and morphology. Where the typological procedure involves
extracting sound objects from an undifferentiated continuum, the morphological procedure requires
the objects to be reheard in terms of their  contextures, that is, as structures of interrelated sub-
objects  themselves.113 His  approach  towards  structuralism  as  such  is  tentative,  and  like  his
phenomenology,  couched  in  claims  of  pragmatic  caution  and  musical  particularism.  The
ambivalence that Claude Lévi-Strauss famously expresses toward musique concrète in the Overture
to his  1984 book  The Raw and the Cooked has been cited to suggest that  Schaeffer should be
considered as an object of structuralist criticism rather than a structuralist himself.114 But Schaeffer's
109Ibid, 36.
110Foucault, Order of Things, 322.
111Schaeffer, Traité, 277-8.
112Ibid, 280.
113Chion, Guide , 56-7. Palombini, ‘Pierre Schaeffer’s Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects’, 65.
114John Dack, ‘Acoulogie: An Answer to Lévi-Strauss?’, in Electroacoustic Music Studies Network Proceedings (2007)
http://www.ems-network.org/IMG/pdf_DackEMS07.pdf; Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked. 
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treatise  does  frequently  respond  to  structuralist  ideas,  and  his  commitment  to  phenomenology
would likely have had structuralist overtones for his immediate audience. Even Merleau-Ponty had
negotiated a synthesis of existentialist and Saussurean principles by the end of his life.115 'For the
philosopher',  Merleau-Ponty writes in  Signs,  'the presence of structure outside us in natural and
social  systems  and  within  us  as  symbolic  function  points  to  a  way  beyond  the  subject-object
correlation which has dominated philosophy from Descartes to Hegel. By showing us that man is
eccentric to himself and that the social finds its center only in man, structure particularly enables us
to understand how we are in a sort of circuit with the socio-historical world.'116 Schaeffer seems to
have been equally receptive to structuralist ideas about the function of culture and history.
We can track this reception in part through Schaeffer's engagement with information theory
and cybernetics. American ideas about communication and control were crucial to the development
of  French  structuralism,  but  they  were  also  swiftly  absorbed  into  popular  discourse  about  the
significance of modern technoscience.117 Yet accounts of avant-garde interest in information theory
have mainly focused on its use in formal construction, and particularly its centrality to the aesthetics
of  serialism.118 Increasingly,  however,  information  theory  is  recognised  as  having  played  a
generative  role  in  a  wide  variety  of  musical  and  scientific  experiments  during  the  Cold  War,
especially for the way it systematised the centrality of situated perception.119 Diverging from the
stereotype of a mechanistic science expressed in terms of hard-wired laws and offering only strictly-
defined paths for attaining authority, cybernetics presented itself as a set of open-ended strategies
Mythologiques, Volume One, trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman, (Chicago, 1983).
115Dosse, History of Structuralism, 37-9.
116Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans. Richard McCleary (Evanston, 1964), 123.
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Literature, and Informatics (Chicago, 1999). More recent studies have consolidated a more transatlantic account of 
the growth of information theory in France. See especially Céline Lafontaine, ‘The Cybernetic Matrix of “French 
Theory”’, Theory Culture Society, 24 (2007), 27–46; Christopher Johnson, ‘“French” Cybernetics’, French Studies, 
69 (2014), 60–78.
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supported  by  exchanges  in  legitimacy  across  disciplines.120 Absolute  formulas  and  normative
abstractions  were  replaced  with  heuristic  'handbooks'  aimed  at  democratising  and  hybridising
knowledge  production.121 Schaeffer's  project  is  shot  through  with  anxieties  over  aesthetic  and
epistemological  contingency,  the  challenges  of  induction  and  statistical  prediction,  and  the
breakdown  of  institutional  authority,  all  of  which  are  hallmarks  of  an  information  theoretical
approach.122 
Direct references to information theory first appear in Schaeffer's 1952 book À la recherche
d'une musique concrète, where his understanding seems to have been mediated through the work of
engineer and philosopher Abraham Moles.  In addition to crediting Moles as a co-author on the
book's final section, a sketch of the  Solfège de l'objet sonore which would later be revised and
expanded to form Book VI of  the  Traité,  Schaeffer  cites  Moles'  writing at  length,  focusing in
particular on the emerging understanding of music in terms of information transmission.123 At this
point,  Schaeffer's  estimation  of  Moles  is  highly enthusiastic.  Moles  passed through Schaeffer's
studio as an advisor while working on his first doctoral thesis in physics in Paris.124 Following this
stint  with  Schaeffer,  he  moved  on  first  to  Swiss  conductor  Hermann  Scherchen's  private
electroacoustic  studio  in  Gravesano,125 and  then,  with  the  help  of  a  modest  grant  from  the
Rockefeller Foundation, to the new Columbia-Princeton studio in New York City.126 Moles draws
heavily on his work with the GRMC in his 1958 philosophy thesis,  Théorie de l'information et
perception esthétique, and his 1960 Rockefeller Foundation report, Les musiques expérimentales.127
120See Geof Bowker, ‘How to Be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-70’, Social Studies of Science, 23 
(1993), 107–27 at 116.
121Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
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Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York, 1954). For a recent assessment of the ontological repercussions of 
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These books foreshadow Schaeffer's treatise in important ways. Here Moles draws liberally on the
terms of existential  phenomenology:  referring to  recording technology as  providing a basis  for
'eidetic  variation',  for  example,  and distinguishing  the  production  of  experimental  music  as  an
'authentic  composition'  in  comparison  with  traditional  instrumental  approaches.128 Moles'  main
concern, however, was to develop a method for measuring the quantities of information contained
in particular musical messages, and thereby to derive inductive judgments of their aesthetic value. It
is here that we find the emergence of a structuralist account of the phenomenological background
similar to the one Schaeffer adopts in the treatise.
For Moles, music was like any form of communication in that it  imposed an essentially
human order on the chaos of the natural universe.129 The backbone of this aesthetics is the concept
of entropy. Bracketing its origin in the technical language of thermodynamics, cyberneticians like
Moles reduced entropy to a statistical formula for determining information content. If the receiver
knew all the units in a series of values sent across a channel in advance, the amount of information
transmitted would be zero. If the receiver knew none of the values in advance, however, the series
would  amount  to  absolute  chaos.  Calculating  the  entropy of  the message  allowed the  receiver,
knowing the probabilities of each unit in the code or language of communication, to calculate the
incoming message's position on a scale between these extremes of order and disorder.130 Several
translations  of the notion of  entropy into  musical  terms were  attempted around the  same time.
Leonard Meyer, for example, gives the role of stabilising nature to the diachronic progress of 'style',
which provides a 'complex set  of probabilities'  internalized by composers and listeners alike to
shape their 'habit responses' and 'latent expectations'.131 Meaningful emotional responses to music
arise for Meyer when these norms are broken—that is, when an individual becomes aware of a
deviation, and his or her latent expectations become 'active'. For Meyer, it follows that information
expérimentales (Paris, 1960).
128Moles, Les Musiques expérimentales, 92.
129Moles, Les Musiques expérimentales, 91.
130Claude Shannon, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, Bell System Technical Journal, 27 (1948), 379–423.
131Leonard Meyer, ‘Meaning in Music and Information Theory’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15 
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quanta provide the source both of originality within the work, and of stylistic progress in history.132
Moles' version, developed independently of Meyer's, is more complex and synchronic. Dividing the
musical signal into a 'semantic message' consisting of quantifiable, convention-bound elements, and
an 'aesthetic message' consisting of more or less ineffable states of perception, Moles identifies no
less than eight simultaneous entropic fields which 'determine each other in an irregular alternation'
during the listening experience itself.133 
Moles appears in the treatise only as a scapegoat for the final remnants of the 'scientific
attitude' that Schaeffer saw himself as having surpassed in the transition from musique concrète to
recherche musicale. Moles' later writings continue to represent the sound object as a physical thing
first and foremost, even including diagrams representing it as a solid three-dimensional mass.134 The
treatise takes several swipes at the engineer's 'imprudent' materialism.135 But Schaeffer continued to
model his understanding of the sound object's relationship with the historical and cultural domains
of  structure on the  logic of  entropy.  This  happens most  prominently in  the 'dialectical'  pairing
Schaeffer  constructs  between the two basic  forces  he calls  permanence  and  variation.136 In the
prototypical form of the musical instrument, for example, Schaeffer finds a stable and repeatable set
of material  'values'  which must  then be varied into a collection of 'characters'  to form musical
utterances.137 He generalises the function of the sound object in similar terms, showing how 'the
same object may be envisaged as carrier of several different structures' when reframed rhythmically,
melodically, or harmonically.138 He formulates the speculative thrust of the treatise by positing an
object-structure relationship in which, rather than the object being articulated in relation to a pre-
132Cf. Leonard Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago, 1956).
133See Moles, Les musiques expérimentales, 100-101.
134Moles, Les Musiques expérimentales, 42-47.  
135See for example Schaeffer, Traité, 60, 167, 495.
136Schaeffer, Traité, 300-3, cf. Chion, Guide, 74-5.
137Schaeffer, Traité, 43-4. In a sense, Schaeffer's account of this logic's 'neanderthal' origins makes the distinction of 
'sounds' from noise the source of musical civilisation itself. See also Hugues Dufourt, ‘Pierre Schaeffer: le son 
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existing structure, an 'authentic structure' might be generated by the qualities of particular set of
objects.139 In  this  sense,  Schaeffer's  understanding of  musical  entropy is  not  far  removed from
contemporaries  like Boulez  or  the  spectralists.140 But  the  logic  also  exerts  an influence  on  the
treatise in the guise of a general ontological politics.141 As Morag Grant has suggested in her work
on serialist theory, entropy bears a strong resemblance to the Hegelian dialectic of nature and Geist,
suggesting a scientific explanation for the historical progress of musical culture that could not have
been far from the minds of post-war theorists.142 Structuralists like Lévi-Strauss took a pessimistic
view,  deploying  notions  of  dynamic  equilibrium  to  relativize  the  mechanical  civilisation  that
threatened  to  repress  cultural  diversity  and  alienate  the  authentic  subject.143 Thermodynamic
metaphors  offered  a  subtle  means  of  resistance  to  the  historical  determinism  of  Marxist
orthodoxy.144 The new science of indeterminacy placed the observer of history and culture inside an
open system, foregrounding the way techniques of knowledge and measurement  construct  their
objects.145 Schaeffer's  proposal  for  recherche musicale  is  similarly  anti-determinist,  figuring the
progress of musicological understanding as having arrived at an impasse in the face of mounting
musical  complexity.146 He  seeks  to  hold  back  the  advance  of  musicological  rationalisation  to
preserve the natural plurality that human musical communication has generated over the course of
its history, and would continue to generate if allowed to develop 'authentically'.
Accordingly,  Schaeffer's  main  concern  is  with  the  relational  dynamics  of  individual
perceptual  structure.  Roman Jakobson's turn from phonetics to phonology—from the science of
vocal  production  to  the  play  of  phonemes  as  a  synchronic  system—is  a  frequent  point  of
reference.147 Schaeffer's  listener  is  oriented  towards  the  production  of  order  in  an  increasingly
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disordered musical universe.  He establishes the relations he sees as underlying different kinds of
auditory attention in the 'Table of Listening Functions'  which appears on page 116 of the 1966
edition. The table presents four implicit levels of aural consciousness on a matrix distinguishing
them in relation to a set of criteria for auditory sign construction: écouter, which Chion explains as
'lending the ear [to a sound source] through the intermediary of sound' or 'treating sound as an index
of its source';  ouïr, or passively perceiving sound as such, with no attentional separation from the
general acoustic background; entendre, which is to 'manifest a listening intention', or to select the
qualities of a sound that are of interest in direct relation to other sounds; and comprendre, which is
to grasp the meaning and values that correspond to the sound as an abstract sign, as in language. 148
Each function includes both a listening behaviour and a description of its semiotic correlates, the
qualities of meaning or reference it engages. Perhaps because the terms Schaeffer chooses are so
difficult to translate from French to English, anglophone scholars have written a great deal on their
contrasting meanings. They are often discussed separately as a  set  of independent  'attitudes'  or
'modes'.149 Kane in Sound Unseen, for example, treats the listening functions as an unordered set of
'noetic acts', each of which corresponds to a different 'noemic' category of sound objects.150 From
this perspective, Schaeffer may appear to have simply reinvoked the familiar modernist distinction
between  active  attention  and  passive  distraction,  between  listening  and  merely  hearing.151 Ian
Biddle, for example, places Schaeffer's program under the sign of a 'fixated listening', ordered by
modernity to 'hold listening in place' and 'keep the doors of the concert hall firmly closed. 152 But
On this point Schaeffer might have saved himself a great deal of trouble by reading Jakobson more closely. As 
Jakobson argued against Saussure, the basic units of language must be understood as coterminous with their 
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such a reading fails to do justice to the order and juxtaposition of the functions.
Schaeffer's  use  of  the table  in  the  treatise  foregrounds not  the  quality  of  the  individual
categories,  but  the  relations  made  possible  by  the  binary  oppositions  between  the  categories.
Listeners are not meant to fall in a fixed mode by habit, but rather to follow what Chion refers to as
perceptual 'circuits' between the sectors depending on the objects and intentions involved.153 The
functions  are  numbered  from one  to  four,  'like  the  hands  of  a  clock',  and  arranged  into  four
quadrants  which  divide  them according  to  two  'dualisms':  'abstract'  in  the  left  column  versus
'concrete' in the right column; and 'objective' in the top row versus 'subjective' in the bottom row.154
There  are  thus  two  functions  in  which  meaning  is  derived  from  outward  reference  points—
comprendre (referential or symbolic) and écouter (indexical)—and two which are directed by inner
apperception—entendre (selective) and ouïr (receptive). Likewise there are two functions oriented
by properties Schaeffer considers to be abstract—comprendre (sign values) and entendre (qualities
of the sound itself which permit it to be divided and classified)—and two by those he considers to
be concrete—écouter (agency, causality and materiality) and ouïr (the sonic as such). Several of the
binary distinctions that appear in the course of Schaeffer's argument map onto the table in a similar
way. For instance, the concrete listening common to all animals with ears (écouter and  ouïr) is
'natural'  for  Schaeffer,  while  the  deductive,  abstract  listening  of  convention-bound  humans
(entendre and comprendre) is 'cultural'.155 The play of oppositions that the table of functions makes
possible  is  an  analytical  device  revealing  the  structural  relations  that  underlie  all  auditory
awareness.156 An intersubjective consensus  may be reached that  an object  fits  with a  particular
category after repeated listenings, but this process is mediated by analysis.157
This heuristic and relational understanding of the listening functions arises frequently in
Schaeffer's discussion of the differences between music and language. Both, he claims, are systems
153Chion, Guide, 25.
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of signs issuing from a common material medium, and studying them thus calls upon a parallel set
of disciplinary formations, focused on either signified or signified, in synchrony or diachrony.158
Each system, however, suppresses a different quadrant in the table of listening functions. Linguistic
listening discards ouïr, having no use for the reception of raw sonic detail, while musical listening
discards  comprendre,  being  unconcerned  with  symbolic  reference.159 The  two  kinds  of
communication  are  thus  distinguished  in  terms  of  the  relations  they  tolerate  between  the  four
listening  functions,  and  not  in  terms  of  opposed  modes  of  listening  as  such.  This  distinction
undergirds a further point in Schaeffer's comparison between musical and linguistic signs. Saussure
famously concludes that the material signifier (which for Schaeffer is equivalent to the object of
ouïr) is merely an arbitrary component of the sign structure (which for Schaeffer is the object of
comprendre). Schaeffer, however,  asserts that  the level of the sonic material  is a necessary and
fundamental  component  of  musical  communication,  while  the  symbolic  level  of  shared  mental
references is not.160 This for Schaeffer places language closer to the influence of cultural norms for
establishing shared codes, while music is closer to the raw forms of nature.
Schaeffer also uses the listening functions to structure the diagram entitled Programme de la
recherche  musicale,  where  he  details  the  differences  between traditional  music  studies  and the
experimental music research programme of the GRM.161 Here again the quadrants are not divided
between the two cultures, as if each privileged a different kind of listening in static opposition with
the other. For Schaeffer, the same set of functions provides the basis for the way both formations
use listening practice as a source of knowledge about sound. Where a conservatoire training calls
upon the capacity for écoute in a course of lutherie or organology, the programme of experimental
music research brings  écoute with the synthesis  of new musical objects.  Where a conservatoire
student  needs  to  perform  ouïe in  perfecting  his  or  her  instrumental  execution,  an experimental
158Schaeffer, Traité, 294-5. In the previous chapter Schaeffer also entertains the notion that phonetics might be 
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music researcher would do the same in a project of typology. Schaeffer draws similar analogies
between the entendres of orchestration and morphology, and between the comprendres of traditional
music theory and experimental  solfège. The distinction between the two systems is thus not the
functions  they occupy or privilege,  but  the circuit  they take between the functions.  Traditional
music  training  moves  from  the  objective  listening  of  comprendre and  écouter to  deduce  the
subjective, while experimental music research begins from the subjective levels of  entendre and
ouïr to induce the objective.
The homology Schaeffer sets up between the two disciplinary configurations privileges a
synchronic viewpoint. This allows Schaeffer to put the treatise forward not only as an authentic
basis  for  the  production  of  'musics  to  be  invented',  but  a  means  of  comparison  between  any
disparate  musical  traditions.162 A  diachronic  comparison,  for  Schaeffer,  presumes  that  other
traditions  must progress inevitably towards the Western system of melodico-harmonic relations.
This is mistaken, he claims, because it wrongly identifies tonality as the fundamental structure of
Western  music.  Instead,  Schaeffer  proposes  to  take  all  traditions  as  equally  contemporary,  not
ordered  in  a  succession  from  primitive  to  advanced,  but  equally  invested  in  the  fundamental
structures revealed by the discovery of the listening functions and the sound object. The listening
functions are thus not the achievement of a particular kind of musical thinking, but the 'common
trunk'  of  all  musics,  agnostic  to  the  particular  'dominant  perceptions',  'families'  of  sounds,  and
musical 'values' that human musics might privilege.163 Taking issue at once with Theodor Adorno's
dismissal of psychology in Philosophie der neuen musik, and with serialist attempts to innovate at
the level of musical codes, Schaeffer suggests that the goal of musical research is thus to abandon
prescriptive  schemas  altogether  in  favour  of  a  deeper  understanding  of  music's  basis  in
consciousness. The result should be a multiplication of musical difference, not only at the level of
code, but also in the elementary materials and meanings music engages.164 
162Ibid, 602-3.
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We need to be cautious about the amount of structuralist ambition we read into Schaeffer's
project. Proponents of a systematic semiology of music like Jean-Jacques Nattiez and Jean Molino
treated Schaeffer as a little more than a precocious amateur, acknowledging his insight into the
mounting  crisis  of  musical  legitimacy  instigated  by  the  avant-garde  and  its  technologies,  but
dismissing his core concepts as confused and misdirected.165 As Carlos Palombini has argued, the
combination of phenomenological and structuralist influences in the treatise is an 'invitation to a
generous  misreading'.166 But  it  is  unfair  to  presume that  Schaeffer's  theoretical  ambitions  were
unrealized  simply because they were eclectic.  The period in  which Schaeffer worked has been
described by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank as 'a fold between modern and postmodern
ways of hypothesizing about the brain and mind'.167 The idea that human cognition was a sort of
computer had just appeared on the horizon, but without the technology to model it in any useful
way,  researchers  found themselves  free  to  speculate  about  how the  'software'  of  consciousness
might operate. In this regard, Schaeffer's project was very much of its time. But this reading also
brings new inconsistencies to the fore. 
In reducing the sound object to its perceptual correlates, and formalising the production of
meaningful sonic relations as a commonly-held 'structure of perception', Schaeffer leaves little room
for a positive account of musical inscription. This logocentrism, to borrow Derrida's term, absorbs
the influences of both Husserl and Saussure to downgrade writing to an act of violence against
human expression. Since acoustic vibration is already a mediation for Schaeffer, notation can be
cast aside as exterior and instrumental.168 Musical forms shaped by notation become pathological.
Sound recording, which provides the basis for both reduced listening itself, and for intersubjective
consensus between listeners, does not at first appear to count for Schaeffer as a form of inscription.
165See Jean Molino, ‘Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music’, trans. J.A. Underwood, Music Analysis, 9, (1990), 
105–56 at 120-4; Nattiez, ‘Le statut sémiologique de l’objet sonore’. It should be noted, in fairness, that this 
generation also found serious fault with the theories of the serialists. See Grant, Serial Music, Serial Aesthetics, 206-
17.
166Palombini, 'Pierre Schaeffer's Typo-Morphology of Musical Objects', 58.
167Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins’, Critical 
Inquiry, 21 (1995), 496–522 at 508–9.
168Derrida, Of Grammatology, 35-8.
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Having reached a certain 'level of fidelity', the function of the apparatus changes from 'reproduction'
to 'reconstitution', allowing the listener to shape sound directly as sound instead of as the result of a
mediating  process.169 So  again,  Schaeffer  insists  upon  a  logocentric  understanding  of  musical
mediation.  The  machine  becomes  a  transparent  prosthesis  to  the  listener's  internal  selection
mechanism,  which  Schaeffer  privileges  as  the  universal  source  of  musical  meaning.  Similarly,
Schaeffer's listening functions leave no space for a situated, embodied listener. Bodies, desires, and
identities  are  completely  evacuated  along  with  their  sometimes  turbulent  social  and  political
conditions. Like the psycho-acousticians in Jonathan Sterne's account of 'perceptual technics', and
contrary  to  his  reputation  as  an  empiricist,  Schaeffer  conducted  his  research  as  if  he  were
investigating human listening as such, not in the interest of finding out about any listener's actual
experiences.170 There is no account of pleasure or power,171 and since Schaeffer misreads Saussure's
langue-parole distinction  as  an  analogue  of  his  own  distinction  between  the  abstract  and  the
concrete,  there  is  no  proper  place  for  the  consideration  of  differences  in  performance  or
competence.172 In  this  respect  Schaeffer's  theory  again  suffers  from  the  same  faults  as  his
structuralist contemporaries, failing to encompass any means of resistance to the polarized order of
functional relations.173 
Conclusion
Schaeffer's colleagues at the GRM seem have to have found the tenets of the treatise less
accessible on the page than in practice. 'The TOM [i.e. Traité des objets musicaux] is ... a reservoir
of provisional ideas to be called into question', explains François Delalande in a 1976 colloquium
169Schaeffer, Traité, 83-4. Schaeffer seems to have developed this view early in his work on radio. See Palombini, 
‘Technology and Pierre Schaeffer'; Pierre Schaeffer, Essai Sur La Radio et Le Cinéma : Esthétique et Technique Des 
Arts-Relais 1941-1942, ed. Carlos Palombini and Sophie Brunet (Paris, 2010). 
170Jonathan Sterne, MP3: The Meaning of a Format (Durham, 2012), 55–60. Schaeffer is unequivocal in attaching his 
account to the generalising category of 'man'. Schaeffer, Traité, 641.
171Cf. Roland Barthes, ‘Écoute’, in L’Obvi et l’obtus : essais critiques III (Paris, 1982), 217–30.
172Schaeffer, Traité, 305-7 and 314.
173For a similar critique of structuralist semiotics see Julia Kristeva, ‘The System and the Speaking Subject’, in The 
Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford, 1986), 24–33.
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collecting  views on the  book's  immediate  legacy.174 Bayle  is  more  critical:  'TOM is  an edifice
constructed in a desert, and we must salute it as such, but it was not nourished by its author. Once it
was written, Schaeffer let it fall. That's why this difficult concept [of the object], separated from its
operational aspect, has fallen behind.'175 Quite early on, then, consensus seems to have decided that
Schaeffer's work should be treated more as a spur to creative invention than a rigorous analytical
system. 'As it was for [Marx's] Capital', speculates Malec, 'nobody will read the treatise. It will be
the least read book, but it may incidentally be the most used.'176
Writing in the same volume, Schaeffer seems in part to accept this fate, describing his book
self-deprecatingly as the 'appraisal of an incomplete research'.177 But the unanswered question of a
compositional system sufficient for the 'operational' goals of the GRM is, for Schaeffer beside the
point. 'I have tirelessly warned composers and researchers', he writes, 'against an all too common
temptation given the general uncertainty: to want to found, on sonic criteria, a musical organization;
to want to deduce, from the knowledge of objects, that of the structures that would arise, in fact,
from a complementary research.'178 Schaeffer continued to assert that his primary achievement was
not the invention of a particular music by manipulating sounds in the studio, but rather the provision
of a basis for understanding all musics as enmeshed in the structure of sonic experience.
Beginning from the objets given to perception and the properties of the perceptual field, it is
thus logical to predict, among the many possible musics, differences more radical still than
between, say, figurative painting and abstract painting. […] The presence of sound and the
occupation of duration open onto many domains. Music is plural.179
Most anglophone scholars still  take Schaeffer's  treatise  at  face value  as a philosophy of
'concrete' composition, in spite of the fact that Schaeffer claimed to be neither a philosopher nor,
paradoxically,  a committed proponent  of  musique concrète.  As I  have shown,  however,  such a
174François Delalande, ‘Ce que le G.R.M. pense du T.O.M.’, Cahiers recherche/musique, 2 (1976), 27–33 at 27.
175Ibid, 29.
176Ibid.
177Pierre Schaeffer, ‘La musique par exemple (positions et propositions sur le Traité des objets musicaux)’, Cahiers 
recherche/musique, 2 (1976), 55–72 at 55.
178Ibid, 59.
179Ibid, 64.
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reading  brackets  the  treatise's  historical  context,  its  intertextual  associations,  and  its  mise  en
pratique. Instead, we should heed Schaeffer's advice to strike the right balance between making and
listening.  From  this  more  holistic  perspective,  Schaeffer's  research  programme  offers  an
experimental interdiscipline attuned to the rediscovery of human auditory experience as a basis for
knowledge  about  music  in  general.  While  it  may suggest  guidelines  for  the  invention  of  new
musical languages, it does not do so exclusively. Its primary concern is with providing an ethical
account of the substance of musical consciousness itself: 'We have tried to describe [...] the birth of
unconscious  musical  systems,  forged  simultaneously  by  practice  and  auditory  training,  which
makes the members of a musical civilization so skilled at recognising the pertinent traits (those that
play a role in structure), at the time time that it makes them practically deaf to the non-pertinent
traits. […] We can now better measure the strength of this training, and all the apprenticeship we
need to unlearn it,  and hear the music of others.'180 Indeed, the use of the treatise has not been
limited to the acousmatic tradition. We might extend some credit to Schaeffer for helping to spark
the spectralist  movement, for instance,  not only for his deep interest in timbre,  but also for his
performative stance as a theorist of musical and cultural pluralism.181
This places Schaeffer much closer to present-day musicological concerns than his followers
normally acknowledge. Using the conceptual tools at his disposal, Schaeffer sought not to establish
a single, correct musical knowledge, but to understand and democratize the means of producing
musical  knowledge.  In  this  regard  his  work  can  easily  be  read  as  part  of  the  long  line  of
cybernetically-inspired musical humanists insisting on the unpredictability of musical expression,
its  continuity  with  language  and  other  forms  of  sonic  gesture,  and  the  entanglement  of  the
researcher  in  the  inductive  study of  musical  knowledge.182 Many aspects  of  Schaeffer's  ethical
message  would  reemerge  decades  later,  albeit  largely  stripped  of  their  speculative  structuralist
180Schaeffer, Traité, 288.
181Cf. Drott, ‘Spectralism, Politics and the Post-Industrial Imagination’. 
182See for example John Blacking, How Musical Is Man? (Seattle, 1973); Christopher Small, Music Society Education 
(New York, 1977); Steven Feld, Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression 
(Philadelphia, 1982).
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formalities, in the guise of 'postmodern',  'decentered',  or 'relational'  musicologies, attuned to the
substance of musical mediation and difference.183 Of course, Schaeffer did not arrive at the kind of
interdisciplinary  'agonism'  argued for  by Georgina  Born,  for  example,  nor  did he  discover any
useful  way  of  moving  beyond  an  immediate  and  highly  schematic  picture  of  the  listening
experience to account for music's wider social conditions. But he did recognize that understanding
musical experience in its diversity required an epistemological and ontological break with cloistered
formalisms,  and  that  achieving  such  a  break  meant  questioning  the  normative  hierarchies  that
measure musical knowledges on scales of technical or material sophistication.
The treatise achieves this advance, however,  by granting the individual listener complete
proprietary power over the production of musical meaning. In this regard Schaeffer falls neatly into
the 'early sound studies' paradigm identified by Benjamin Steege with regard to the work of R.
Murray Schafer, 'preoccupied with cordoning off, naturalization, or intensive policing of a specific
difference of the aural'.184 Both Ian Biddle and Peter Szendy have identified Schaeffer's theory with
the emergence of individualized modes of musical  reception under late capitalism.185 Recording
technology,  according  to  Szendy,  allows us  to  make music  of  our  listening  itself,  and thus  to
exchange our listenings with others. But in Schaeffer's model, the perceptual structure underlying
listening is innate and universal. While there may be many musics, there is only one, universal set
of  listening functions.  Schaeffer's  operative  distinction between nature and culture—the natural
being  chaotic  and  permanent,  while  the  cultural  is  normative  and  contingent186—pushes  the
listening  functions  into  a  transcendent  position.  So while  plurality  is  accepted  as  primary,  the
listener becomes like Latour's 'modern anthropologist', severing any deeper links with exotic nature-
183Lawrence Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (Berkeley, 1996); Kevin Korsyn, Decentering 
Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research (Oxford, 2003); Georgina Born, ‘For a Relational 
Musicology: Music and Interdisciplinarity, Beyond the Practice Turn’, Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 
135 (2010), 205–43; Nicholas Cook, ‘Anatomy of the Encounter: Intercultural Analysis as Relational Musicology’, 
in Stan Hawkins (ed.), Musicological Reflections: Essays in Honour of Derek B. Scott, (Farnham, 2012), 193–209.
184Benjamin Steege, ‘Acoustics’, in Keywords in Sound, ed. David Novak and Matt Sakakeeny (Durham, 2015), 22–32 
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cultures.187 Indeed,  the  interrelated  complexes  of  sound objects  and  musical  structures  that  the
listening subject constitutes need to transcend nature and culture in order to be truly universal, and
thus music itself becomes a kind of 'supplement' to the division.188 Schaeffer makes no attempt to
address this issue by questioning the dialectical history of the nature-culture binary in music, for
example,  or by trying to conceive of a common ground beyond the individual mind that  could
encompass the variety of musics and listenerships as a real plurality. Thus Schaeffer's interdiscipline
falls short of recent attempts to rethink the composition of cultural polities along 'equivocal' lines of
material difference.189 He does not equip us with the tools to 'hear the hearing of others', as Jonathan
Sterne suggests should be the goal of sound studies.190 While he is prepared to embrace and defend
plurality at the level of musical experience and expression, he still sees the diversity of cultures as a
kind of veil concealing the absolute reality of shared perceptual structures. His faith in universal
structures  of  consciousness  overrides  any  intuition  about  the  volatilities  or  differences  in
experience.191 
In  many  ways,  however,  Schaeffer's  listener  also  undermines  this  reductive  humanism.
Vehemently  resistant  to  deductive  reasoning as  to  the  content  of  experience,  Schaeffer  largely
abstracts the subject from liberal notions of sovereignty or self-interest. Understood relationally as a
system of attentional circuits, Schaeffer's listening functions need no correlation with states of self-
reflection; they are simply encounters between a pre-personal listening machine and a field of sonic
intensities.  While  the  treatise  portrays  recording  technologies  as  an  instrumental  extension  of
listening,  the relationship could easily be formulated the other way around.  There is  no natural
listening prior to cultural techniques.192 What Schaeffer leaves us with is thus a series of open-ended
challenges: to multiply the methodological possibilities for music and sound studies; to complicate
187Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, 1993), 97-100; cf. Schaeffer, Traité, 41–50.
188This is also one of Derrida's primary criticisms of Lévi-Strauss. See Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play’, 282–4.
189See for example William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, 2005), 68-92; Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘Perspectival 
Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation’, Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of 
Lowland South America, 2 (2004), 3–22.
190Jonathan Sterne, ‘Hearing’, 74 [my emphasis].
191Schaeffer, Traité, 603-5.
192Sterne, ‘Hearing’, 69. Veitl, for example, emphasises the role of new technologies in engendering the notion of 
music research as such. Veitl, Politiques, 12.
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our understanding of what is 'human' in technologically mediated musical behaviour; and to attend
more  closely  to  the  entanglement  of  bodies,  disciplines,  cultures,  and  machines  in  listening
experience.
